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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GENERAL WELFARE
DOCTRINE
GeraldS. Dickinsont

It is black-letter law that the U.S. Supreme Court's takings doctrine
presupposes exercises of eminent domain are in pursuit of valid public uses that
requirejust compensation. But, neitherfederal doctrine nor the text of the Takings
Clause offers any additional constraints. The story of the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence is, in other words, incomplete and deserves reexamination. However,
the usual protagonists,such as the Supreme Court orfederal courts, are not central 'to
this Article's reexamination. Instead, this Article's narrative is federalism, its
charactersare state courts, and its script is state constitutions.
In the post-Kelo v. New London era, state legislatures and courts diverged
from federal takings doctrine to expand property protections beyond the
constitutionalfloor set by the Supreme Court. Propertyscholars, however, have paid
less attention to a doctrinal lacuna left behind after the nationwide state legislative
backlash: state courts' failure to recognize an implicit obligation of local
municipalities to satisfy "generalwelfare" principleswhen taking privatepropertyfor
economic development purposes as a matter of state constitutional law. The
proposition of this Article is simple: state public use clauses should be understood to
equate with state police power general welfare principles. This is what I call "state
constitutionalgeneral welfare doctrine."
This cross-pollination of police power and takings doctrine also reveals that
takings doctrine is highly fluid and malleable, capable of incorporatinga variety of

t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to Nestor
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constitutional doctrines, such as substantiallyadvances tests, exactions doctrine, and
equal protection doctrine, to provide greateralternative conceptions of protections to
private property. The commingling of state police power principles, such as general
welfare, as equating with "publicuse" is just another example of takings doctrine's
ability to mold in a manner to provide enhanced protections to private property
beyond the Supreme Court's constitutionalbottom.
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INTRODUCTION

Takings law is flexible and fluid. The Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence is no stranger to creative commingling of constitutional
standards by state and federal courts in search of the right mix of
standards and tests to advance the doctrine. This rich doctrinal history
of intermingled constitutional standards is apparent in the substantially
advances, exactions, and equal protection doctrines.' For example, the
Court's previous debates over due process inquiries and takings in Agins
v. City of Tiburon2 and Lingle v. Chevron3 support the proposition that
mixing constitutional doctrines may be necessary to impose additional
constraints on the Court's public use test. In Agins, the Court found that
government regulation of private property would give rise to a taking if
the regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests."4 The "substantially advances" test requires an analysis into
whether regulations substantially advance legitimate state interests or
deny a property owner economically viable use of his land.5 Of course,
this requires weighing competing private and public interests. And prior
to the Court's ruling in Lingle, which foreclosed due process inquiries in
takings,6 a substantial number of state courts engaged in this crosspollination of constitutional doctrines.
The Court in Lingle noted that the "apparent commingling of due
process and takings inquiries" was improper,7 because due process is
not "tethered .... to the text of the Takings Clause."8 While this was
arguably the right doctrinal move by the Court, the commingling of due
process and takings doctrine by state courts for decades prior to Lingle
arguably supports the proposition that state courts could normatively
"tether" general welfare principles to public use inquiries as
a matter of
state constitutional law.
1 See infra Part III.
2 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
3 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
4 447 U.S. at 260.
5 Id.
6 544 U.S. at 540.

7 Id. at 541.
8 Id. at 542.
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The Court's exactions doctrine has also been cross-pollinated by
state courts who have "put the government to its proof-requiring a
demonstrated connection between the challenged taking and the
particular purpose used to justify it,"9 similar to the Nollan and Dolan
tests. 10 The Illinois Supreme Court, in Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C.,11 for example,
intermingled the heightened standard of review employed in the
Supreme Court's Nollan and Dolan exaction jurisprudence to find an
economic development taking unjustifiable where the property was
transferred from one private entity for the benefit and use of another
private entity.12
The Court's "class of one" equal protection jurisprudence has
combined with takings doctrine to create a unique mix of equal
protection and takings protections to private property. The Court's
ruling in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,13 holding that a homeowner
could assert equal protections claims "as class of one" in the zoning
context, has been employed by litigants in state court in the eminent
domain context.14 The mixing of these doctrines creates an intriguing
argument that "if [private] property is singled out for eminent domain"
and other properties are not, then the homeowner can bring suit to
"challenge the arbitrariness of the decision to take the property" as a
violation of equal protection.'1 A few state courts, particularly in New
York, have entertained this claim by plaintiff property owners seeking to
invalidate exercises of eminent domain on the theory that properties
located within a redevelopment project had been intentionally treated
differently than other similarly situated properties. 16
9 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 934, 936 (2003).
10 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding that government condition
on development permit must have essential nexus to public harm); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994) (same).
11 Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Il1. 2002).
12 Id.

13 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
14 Id.; see also Josh Blackman, Equal Protectionfrom Eminent Domain: Protectingthe Home
of Olech's Class of One, 55 LOY. L. REV. 697 (2009).
15 Blackman, supra note 14, at 700.
16 See infra Part III.
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Absent from this account of cross-pollination is tethering state
constitutional general welfare principles with state constitutional public
use tests. Federal takings doctrine and the text of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause offer limited constraints on the public use vein of the
Takings Clause. As a result, this Article explores federalist dimensions of
takings law to argue for an additional mode of takings protections that
relies upon state courts and state constitutions as its foundation, not to
supplant, but to supplement, current takings doctrine. The proposition
of this Article is simple: State public use clauses should be understood to
equate with state general welfare principles as a matter of state
constitutional law. This is what I call "state constitutional general
welfare doctrine."
Underlying this federalist narrative are familiar legalists. Justice
Louis Brandeis once wrote, "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."17 Indeed, his words were
followed up years later by Justice William Brennan, who urged state
courts to play a greater role in protecting constitutional rights by relying
on state constitutions as more effective guarantors of individual rights
than the United States Constitution.18 In the context of takings law, the
notion of federalism is ever-present, but property scholars spend a
pittance of time reflecting on federalist dimensions in takings doctrine'19
The Court's recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin, however, brought
federalism to the forefront of the Court's most recent permutation of its
takings doctrine. In the Chief Justice John Roberts's dissent, he noted,
"[o]ur decisions have, time and again, declared that the Takings Clause
protects private property rights as state law creates and defines them."20
Indeed, property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined

17 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
19 See, e.g., Gerald S.Dickinson, Federalism, Convergence, and Divergence in Constitutional
Property, 73 U. MIAMI L. REv. 139 (2018).
20

Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."21

On the other hand, the last time the Court's public use doctrine
was explicitly linked to federalism concerns in eminent domain takings
was its Kelo v. New London ruling.22 There, the Court upheld economic
development takings as a justifiable public use. Justice Stevens explained
that "nothing in [the] opinion precludes [state courts and state
legislatures] from placing further restrictions" on "public use" than the
federal minimum "as a matter of state constitutional law."23 Those
remarks generated substantial eminent domain reform at the statelevel.24 Most state legislatures amended or enacted new eminent domain
statutes to bar or restrict takings for economic development.25 State
26
courts handed down rulings prohibiting takings with a private motive.
27
However, a slew of blight removal exceptions remained intact. As Ilya
Somin suggests, "the political backlash to Kelo has provided the same
level of protection for property owners as would a judicial ban on
economic development takings."28

After the Kelo decision, less than a quarter of the states amended
their takings clauses to provide further protections from economic
development takings.29 Most of these amendments paralleled the
language state legislatures had inserted into eminent domain statutes to
bar or restrict economic development takings.30 Few state courts have
outright banned economic development takings as a matter of state
constitutional law.31 Indeed, state canons played a limited role in the

Kelo revival of federalism in takings, even though state legislatures were
aggressive in their pursuit of the electorate's preferences for stronger
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
22 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
21

23 Id. at 489.
24 Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 2100, 2178 (2009).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.

28 Id. at 2103.
29 Id. at 2117.

30 See infra Part II.

31 See Ilya Somin, The JudicialReaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOv'T L. REV. 1, 3, 7-10 (2001).
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protections from government expropriation. Local municipalities, all
the while, can still skirt the economic development bans and limitations
by condemning land under the veil of "blight removal."32
In a post-Kelo era, scholars have paid less attention to another
implication of state court divergence and federalism: state courts' failure
to recognize an implicit obligation for local municipalities to satisfy
"general welfare" principles as part of the public use test
when taking
private property for economic development purposes. 33 In other words,
scholars and jurists, along with state legislatures, neglected to focus
attention to an area of state constitutional law that would likely have
offered greater protections to economic development takings beyond
legislative amendments.
This doctrinal lacuna, left in the wake of the post-Kelo backlash,
deserves exploration. The Court's language on the relationship between
"public use" and the "police power" in Berman v. Parker,
Hawaii
HousingAuthority v. Midkiff, and Kelo is instructive for establishing the
framework for this Article's doctrinal pivot to cross-pollinate state
police power and general welfare principles with the public use test.
In Berman, by upholding the District of Columbia's eminent
domain power for the purpose of urban redevelopment, the Court noted
that the
[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order ... are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet
they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit
it .... The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.34
The Court's opinion in Midkiff, decades later, expressly tied the
two concepts together, stating that the "'public use' requirement
is... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."35

32 See Gerald S. Dickinson, Inclusionary Takings Legislation, 62 VILL. L. REv. 135 (2017).
33 See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 59-60 (2006) (arguing
that general welfare should be a consideration in urban redevelopment projects likened to those

in Berman v. Parker).
34 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
35 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
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Justice O'Connor went further in Midkiff, stating that there is,
nonetheless, "a [limited] role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the
eminent domain power is equated with the police power."36 Likewise,
Justice Stevens channeled Justice O'Connor's sentiments on the role of
courts in takings review in his Kelo opinion. There, he invoked a "strong
theme of federalism" by "emphasizing the 'great respect' that [the
Supreme Court] owe[s] to state legislatures and state courts in
37
discerning local public needs" in eminent domain determinations.
Justice Stevens then stated that "nothing in our opinion precludes any
State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power.... as a matter of state constitutional law."38
There is, in other words, a place for state courts to constrain
exercises of police power, including eminent domain takings. Justice
Stevens's invocation of state constitutional law as a vehicle for placing
stronger restrictions on public use is where this Article sets out to
propose a "state constitutional general welfare doctrine."
State courts do have "a role ... to play in reviewing a [state]

legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use"39 and nothing
precludes state courts from interpreting state "public use" to equate with
the "catch-all" "general welfare" requirements under state constitutional
law.40 It is telling that Justice O'Connor had to walk back her broad and
sweeping language in Midkiff twenty years later in Kelo, tying together
the police power and public use in unison, when she noted that the
majority opinion in Kelo "demonstrates why, when deciding if a taking's
purpose is constitutional, the police power and 'public use' cannot
always be equated."41 Justice O'Connor proceeded to explain that "[t]he
trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit and
incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually
reinforcing" and that any benefits to a private corporation or developer

36

Id.

37 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005).
38 Id. at 489.
39

Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.

Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police PowerRevisited: Phantom Incorporationand the Roots
of the Takings "Muddle", 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 900 n.355 (2006).
41 Kelo, U.S. 545 at 501-02.
40
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would be difficult to disaggregate from the promised public gains in
taxes and jobs.42
In other words, what Justice O'Connor seems to have done in her
majority opinion in Midkiff and dissent in Kelo is to broaden "public
use" to equate with police powers, except where there is an identifiable
incidental public benefit to a developer who promised additional taxes
and jobs. The problem with this reasoning is that there are few, if any,
constitutional constraints on takings like economic development that
fall outside the scope of O'Connor's envisioned "police power" takings
at issue in Berman and Midkiff.
The post-Kelo statewide backlash is evidence to suggest that the
role of state constitutions is to constrain the exercise of the police power
and the public use requirement for eminent domain by treating the
public use question as nothing more than an inquiry into the "general
welfare" principles under state constitutional law. There is precedent for
state courts applying general welfare principles as a constraint on
exercises of police power in the zoning context that supports this
Article's proposition.
The South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
saga in New Jersey resulted in a judicial doctrine that required
municipalities to take affirmative steps to provide a reasonable and fair
share obligation of affordable housing under its zoning laws. There, the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated "[i]t is required that, affirmatively, a
zoning regulation, like any police power enactment, must
promote... the general welfare [and] a zoning enactment which is
contrary to the general welfare is invalid."43 The court noted that
"general welfare" is broad enough to encompass public health,
safety,
and morals. But the court went further, noting that "police power
enactments" must conform to "basic state constitutional requirements
of substantive due process.., which may be more demanding than
those of the federal constitution." 44 Moreover, the court stated that even
in the absence of "general welfare" principles under the state's zoning
enabling statute, those same principles would still be required to be

42

Id.

43 S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J. 1975).
44 Id.
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followed under the state constitution, and if they were not, then a
zoning law is "theoretically" invalid as a matter of state constitutional
law.45 Indeed, the "basic importance of housing ... fall[s] within"
general welfare principles broadly conceived as including public health,
safety, and morals.46 If state general welfare principles, even if absent
from state statutes authorizing the police power, are imposed as
constraints on municipal exercises of police powers such as zoning, then
it is equally appropriate for state courts, as a matter of state
constitutional law, to equate "public use" with "general welfare" as an
additional shield for private property owners in eminent domain
challenges.
State constitutional general welfare doctrine is not the first
scholarly effort to propose an additional constraint on eminent domain,
as scholars have raised similar sentiments about a lack of concern for
general welfare in urban redevelopment projects like that in Berman v.
Parker.47 An explicit state constitutional general welfare doctrine
originates from Kelo, not Berman. But there are key differences. Prior
scholarship sought to provide protections directly for discrete and
45
46

Id.
Id.

47 See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 58-60 (arguing that exercises of eminent domain power
"must... [include considerations] of race and class"). McFarlane's proposal is a good example
of the insular and discrete group protection that additional constraints on eminent domain
might result in. She states:
I argue that in light of these disparate needs and interests, there are limits, by virtue
of constitutional obligations of the police power, to local government's ability to
facilitate redevelopment projects that deliberately aim to accomplish class
transformation and exclusively reconfigure the inner city for the affluent.... For the
city to aid the winners, and to craft the affluent paradise that today's wealthy
professional seeks, is an improper use of police power as well as an offense to
inclusivity and egalitarian principles that reject race and class discrimination.
Id. at 7, 39; see also Michele Alexandre, "Love Don't Live Here Anymore": Economic Incentives
for a More Equitable Model of Urban Redevelopment, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 5 (2008)
(arguing that "public purpose" inquiries should require nondisplacement of poor residents);
Robert C. Bird, Reviving Necessity in Eminent Domain, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 239, 266
(2010) (arguing for a heightened standard of review in takings for the purpose of blight
removal); Ronald K. Chen, Gallenthin v. Kaur: A ComparativeAnalysis of How the New Jersey
and New York Courts Approach Judicial Review of the Exercise of Eminent Domain for
Redevelopment, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 987, 1020 (2011) (arguing low-income families should
be treated "fairly" in eminent domain decisions).
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arguably insular groups, 48 and none have explicitly invoked broader
"general welfare" principles as equivalent to "public use" more
narrowly.
Further, few, if any, of these scholars propose additional constraints on
eminent domain as a matter of federalism concerns in takings.
This Article is unpacked in four Parts. Part I explores how state
constitutional general welfare doctrine has strong precedential support
for amalgamating constitutional doctrines into one, including the
Court's Agins substantially advances doctrine, the Court's Nollan and
Dolan exactions standards, and the Court's Olech equal protection class
of one jurisprudence. Indeed, takings doctrine has exhibited a certain
level of fluidity in its coalescence with other constitutional provisions,
and some state courts have reciprocated by commingling those
standards to find the right balance to protect private property rights.
State constitutional general welfare doctrine is simply yet another
example of multiple doctrines bleeding into takings doctrine.
Part II pivots this Article's narrative to a discussion of federalism
and state constitutionalism to understand the lacuna in takings doctrine
that should be filled with a new cross-pollinated jurisprudence. After the
Kelo decision, state actors resisted public use doctrine nationwide by
amending or barring takings for economic development under state law
or amendments to state constitutions. However, state constitutional law
played a far more limited role than state legislation after Kelo. This Part
explains that state courts post-Kelo diverted from federal takings
doctrine and showed a willingness to resist the Court's public use
jurisprudence. But state courts failed to go further to recognize an
implicit obligation for local municipalities to satisfy "general welfare"
principles as part of the public use test when taking private property for

48 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); David A. Dana,
Exclusionary Eminent Domain, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 7, 10 (2009) (proposing an
"exclusionary eminent domain doctrine [that] would not absolutely
bar" economic
development takings or "condemnation of low-income housing ... but... would result in the
application of heightened review"); James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass HalfFull or
Half Empty?, 17 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 136 (2009) (arguing for definition of blight to mean
threats to health and safety); Martin E. Gold & Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight
in Eminent Domain, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119, 1169 (2011) (arguing for new definitions of
blight); Matthew J.Kokot, Balancing Blight: Using the Rules Versus Standards Debate to
Construct a Workable Definition of Blight, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 47-48 (2011)
(arguing that "blight" should be "defined in the framework of a 'complex rule"').
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economic development purposes. It is here that we find a through-line
for which to explore this Article's proposed doctrine.
Part III proposes "state constitutional general welfare doctrine" as a
missing doctrinal link post-Kelo and, more importantly, an additional
constraint on takings. The origins of this doctrinal pivot come from the
Court's struggle to conceptualize the "police power" and "public use" in
Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo. However, a closer look at the language of the
opinions suggests that state courts have an important institutional role
to play in constraining broad conceptions of the police power and
public use, and that state constitutional law should perhaps play an
outsized role in implying a general welfare obligation.
Part IV offers a doctrinal cash-out. Intermingling general welfare
principles as part of the public use inquiry raises the prospect that state
public use clauses may be narrowed in application to constrain
traditional justifications for eminent domain, such as urban
redevelopment, blight removal, and economic development.
I.

CROSS-POLLINATION IN TAKINGS DOCTRINE

This Part explores instances of cross-pollination where
constitutional doctrines and tests were commingled with takings
doctrine in different contexts. Doing so will not only substantiate this
Article's proposal to blend general welfare principles with public use
doctrine, but also will reveal the relative fluidity of takings doctrine.49
Indeed, takings doctrine is highly variable. This adaptability has become
ever-important in a post-Kelo era where state courts are continuously
called upon to grant greater protections to private property beyond the
constitutional bottom. But state courts, not the Supreme Court or
federal courts, are better equipped to depart from-rather than build
upon-the traditional constraints on public use.
Nothing under contemporary takings jurisprudence would
preclude "general welfare" concepts ordinarily reserved for state police
power exercises from bleeding into state public use tests. But we need to
look elsewhere to find evidence of cross-pollination working in other

49

See infra Part III.
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constitutional spheres. The following examples of doctrinal integration
across constitutional provisions provide a conceptual framework for
understanding how transferable takings law functions for litigants
seeking to protect private property from government expropriation and,
more importantly, why a state constitutional general welfare doctrine is
an appropriate addition to the existing rich history of fluidity in takings
doctrine.
A.

The SubstantiallyAdvances Test

The Kelo decision that set off a nationwide divergence from federal
takings doctrine was decided the same year as Lingle. But, as
commentators have noted, Lingle received far less attention.50 Yet,
Lingle's doctrinal implications are important for understanding the
utility of a state constitutional general welfare doctrine proposed in Part
III. The Court's doctrine prior to Lingle tended to set forth dicta that
caused due process concepts "to bleed into takings law."sl While this
"cross-pollination"2 may cause some confusion
in understanding
contemporary takings doctrine, the coalescence of due process concepts
and regulatory takings doctrine substantiates this Article's conceptual
foundation, even though the Court's ultimate determination in Lingle
was to reject such blended doctrine. The Court's decisions in Agins,
Nectow v. Cambridge,53 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,54 and
finally ending with Lingle instruct the potential for coalescing general
welfare principles in the public use inquiry.55
In Agins, the Court found that government regulation of private
property will give rise to a taking if the regulation "does not

50 See Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle,
and
Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 613-14 (2007); D.
Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The PotentialLong-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron
and the Separation of Takings and SubstantiveDue Process, 69 ALB. L. REv. 343, 343-44 (2006).

51 Barros, supra note 50, at 344-45.
52

Id.

53
54

Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928).
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).

55

See Barros, supra note 50, at 343-45.
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substantially advance legitimate state interests."56 In formulating this
"substantially advances" test, the Agins Court relied upon due process
precedent in Nectow and Village of Euclid in the zoning context. In
Nectow, a city ordinance deprived a landowner of his property without
due process,5 7 while in Village of Euclid, the quintessential zoning case,
the Court found that a zoning ordinance only survives substantive due
process challenges if the ordinance is not "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, orgeneral welfare."58 In light of Agins, it seemed obvious that the
natural progression would be to review government exercises of the
police power, specifically regulations that affect a Fifth Amendment
taking, under the same substantial advances test, because the test
prescribes an inquiry into the nature of due process and suggests a
means-ends test to determine whether regulating private property
achieves some legitimate public purpose.
The substantially advances inquiry of due process in land use
regulations seeks to evaluate the magnitude and character of the burden
that a regulation imposes upon private property rights.59 In other words,
the inquiry seeks to review the underlying validity of the regulation.0 As
the Lingle Court explained, the inquiry 'suggests a means-end test" and
asks whether the "regulation of private property is effective in achieving
some legitimate public purpose."61

But, the Court said that the "substantially advances" test does not
reveal much about "the magnitude or character of the burden a
particular regulation imposes upon private property rights."62 Further,
the inquiry does not, according to the Court, provide "any information
about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property
owners."63 Indeed, the Court concluded that "such a test is not a valid
method of discerning whether private property has been 'taken"' for a

56 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
57 Nectow, 277 U.S. at 185-89.
58 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (emphasis added).
59 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539-40 (2005).
60 Id. at 543.
61 Id. at 542.
62
63

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. (alteration in original).

2019]

GENERAL WELFARE DOCTRINE

2957

public use. 64 As a result, the Court found the "apparent commingling of
due process and takings inquiries" to be improper,65 because it is
"tethered neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to
the basic
justification for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the
Clause."66

But the Lingle opinion also states that "if a government action is
found to be impermissible-for instance because it fails to meet the
'public use' requirement.., that is the end of the inquiry."67 The
Court
leaves a gaping analytical hole as to how the public use inquiry ends
when the government fails the public use requirement, particular if the
Takings Clause "presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit
of a valid public purpose."68
As for state courts, a significant number followed the amalgamated
nature of "substantially advances" tests in the takings doctrine. In
California, for example, a significant number of state appellate courts
cited or relied upon the test in takings inquiries.69 Other state supreme
courts analyzed takings challenges under the cross-pollinated doctrine.70
The Idaho Supreme Court, although deeming Agins slightly murky,
reviewed a takings challenge to a zoning ordinance under the crosspollinated test.71 The Oregon Supreme Court found that a zoning
ordinance did "substantially advance[] legitimate governmental

64 Id.
65 Id. at 541.

66 Id. at 542.
67 Id. at 543.

68 Id.

69 See San Remo Hotel LP v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 108-09 (Cal. 2002);
Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1007 (Cal. 1999); Landgate, Inc. v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Cal. 1998); Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 859 (Cal. 1997); Ehrlich v. City of Culver, 911 P.2d 429, 443 (Cal. 1996).
70 R&Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289 (Ala. 2001); Burrows v. City of
Keene, 432 A.2d 15, 19-20 (N.H. 1981); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1217-18
(N.Y. 2004); State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ohio 2002);
Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Council of the City of Richmond Heights, 690 N.E.2d 510, 512, 514
(Ohio 1998); April v. City of Broken Arrow, 775 P.2d 1347, 1348 (Okla. 1989); Mayhew v.
Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex- 1998); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v.
Washington, 13 P.3d 183, 193 (Wash. 2000); Grady v. City of St. Albans, 297 S.E.2d 424, 428
(W. Va. 1982).
71 Cty. of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983).
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interests, and [that the zoning ordinance did] not deny property owners
therefore, was not a taking. The Texas
economically viable use... "72 It,
Supreme Court, likewise, found that a municipal regulation
substantially advanced a legitimate governmental interest, but that it
was not a regulatory taking nonetheless.73 The Supreme Court of
Indiana, in Ragucci v. Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion
County, analyzed a zoning determination under the Agins test, finding
that it substantially advanced the municipal agency's interest in
74
rezoning neighborhoods to create multi-family buildings. Indeed, state
courts have welcomed attempts by litigants to blend "substantially
advances" tests in takings doctrine. Of course, while the Court in Lingle
found such mixing inappropriate, it is still well-established that, for
years prior to Lingle, state courts were looking to this multifaceted
approach to review local regulations and municipal action.
B.

Exactions Means-End Inquiry

Public use inquiries have been blended with other areas of takings
law, such as heightened standards of review in exaction cases. For
example, a state court in Illinois has "put the government to its proofrequiring a demonstrated connection between the challenged taking and
T
the particular purpose used to justify it." 5 This is an example of the
Court's Nollan and Dolan76 tests that determine whether economic
development takings are justified public uses. The tests emphasize a
means-end approach to government imposition of conditions in
exchange for development permits, requiring the state to show an
essential nexus or rough proportionality between the condition imposed
on the developer to mitigate a public harm caused by the developer's
construction project. If the state cannot meet that heightened burden,

72

Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Or. 1993).

Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004).
74 Ragucci v. Metro. Dev. Comm'n of Marion Cty., 702 N.E.2d 677 (Ind.1998).
75 See Garnett, supra note 9, at 936.
76 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding that government condition
on development permit must have essential nexus to public harm); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994) (same).
73
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then courts will find the condition unconstitutional in violation of the
Takings Clause.
In National City Environmental,77 the Supreme Court of Illinois
cross-pollinated the heightened standard of review employed in the
Supreme Court's exaction jurisprudence to find an economic
development taking unjustifiable where the property was transferred
from one private entity for the benefit and use of another private
entity.78 The issue before the court in National City Environmental was
whether a development authority could condemn property owned by a
private company and then convey the property to a motorsports
corporation for economic development purposes. 79 The court noted that
"the exercise of [the power of eminent domain] is not entirely
beyond
judicial scrutiny.., and it is incumbent upon the judiciary to ensure
that the power [] is used in a manner contemplated" by the particular
constitution.80 However, the state supreme court rejected the economic
development justifications as inconsistent with the "public use" clause of
the state constitution. It did so based on a finding that the "government
failed to demonstrate that the condemnation-on-demand scheme was
justified by legitimate policy goals."81 In effect, the court noted that the
government's "true intentions were not clothed in an independent,
legitimate governmental decision to further a planned public use" and
failed to provide evidence of a "thorough study" or "formulate any
economic plan."82 The taking was simply to assist the developer in

expanding his development goals as a "default broker" when
negotiations failed with the landowners, instead of taking the property
in a manner "rooted" in sound economic and planning processes. 83 In
other words, the court reasoned that the means (advertising eminent
domain for a fee at request of private developer) to advance the goal of
economic development exceeded the public use limitations of the state

77
78
79
80

Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ii. 2002).
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.

81 See Garnett, supra note 9, at 978.
82 Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d at 10.
83

Id.
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takings clause.84 The court rejected the notion that the means of
executing projects are "beyond judicial scrutiny" once the public
purpose has been established.85
As Nicole Garnett explains, the court "put the government to its
proof-requiring a demonstrated connection between the challenged
taking and the particularpurpose used to justify it."86 In other words,
the Illinois Supreme Court engaged in a modified rational basis review,
rejecting the government's argument that it could take private property
87
for any "conceivable" public use, and instead employed what Garnett

finds to be the exactions heightened standard of review, because that
standard requires the government to show a connection between the
means of placing a condition on a development permit and the ends for
which the condition would be used.88 Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme
Court in National City Environmental required "the government to
establish a means-ends connection similar to that demanded in Nollan
and Dolan."89

Other commentators, such as Richard Epstein, have raised the
question of whether the Nollan and Dolan heightened standard of
review could conceivably bleed into traditional public use inquiries in
eminent domain cases, noting that it is unclear whether exactions
analysis "will carry over to other portions of the takings clause" and
whether Midkiff "can survive Dolan."90 Indeed, it is possible, as Garnett
explains, that a test could be formulated that "abandons rational-basis
review and requires the government to link the means by which it
acquires land to the particular purpose."91 The test would likely require
a local government to show, similar to exactions, that condemnation is
"reasonably necessary" to advance the public purpose used to justify the

84 Id. at 10; see Garnett, supra note 9, at 978.
85 Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d at 1, 8.
86 See Garnett, supra note 9, at 936.
87 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (noting that a legislature may
take private property for any conceivable public use as part of the public use inquiry).
88 See Garnett, supra note 9, at 937.
89

Id.

90 Id. at n.16 (citing Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 491-92 (1995)).
91 Id. at 938.
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taking.92 Thomas Merrill has also argued for a similar coalescence of
means and ends inquiries in eminent domain challenges.93 He posits
that "where and how government should get property, not what it may
do with it... demands a more narrowly focused and judicially
manageable inquiry than the ends approach" of traditional public use. 94
This may be exactly what the Supreme Court may have meant to do in
Nollan and Dolan.95 It does not seem that the exactions tests have been
"formalized" in any way in other states to extend to public use takings
inquiries.96 However, National City Environmental is a prime example
of the exaction test coalescing with the public use inquiry and is,
nonetheless, another illustration of the fluidity of the Takings Clause at
the state level.
C.

Class of One Equal ProtectionDoctrine

In the Supreme Court's ruling in Olech, a homeowner sued a
municipality, arguing that the Village's demand for a thirty-three-foot
easement violated equal protection.97 The Court, in a brief opinion,
stated that the homeowner could assert an equal protection claim as a
"class of one."98 While challengers to zoning ordinances have
utilized
the Olech decision, it could conceivably be applied to "challenge an
eminent domain taking for private development."99 In other words,
Olech raised the prospect that a homeowner could be a class of one, as
opposed to those with inherent characteristics traditionally reserved for
equal protection claims, such as race or religion, to argue that "if their
property is singled out for eminent domain" and other properties are
not, then the homeowner can bring suit to "challenge the arbitrariness
of the decision to take the property." 100
92 Id.

93 Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 66 (1986).
94 See Garnett, supra note 9, at 941 (citing Merrill, supra note 93, at 66).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 937.

97 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
98 Id.
99 Blackman, supra note 14, at 700.
1O Id.
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As Nestor Davidson explains, the Takings Clause protects against
changes in existing background state property rights, and does not serve
to find for discriminatory intent behind government action, and
therefore the Takings Clause "is not the place to remedy that
problem."101 There is arguably a place for takings law to bleed into
Olech's class of one equal protection doctrine, specifically takings for
economic development purposes that threaten homeowners.102 Such
claims could arise by property owners under Section 1983, alleging the
proceedings
condemnation
agency commencing
government
similarly
other
than
differently
"intentionally" treated the landowner
situated landowners and that the difference in treatment lacked a
rational basis.103 However, an eminent domain proceeding is "less likely
to be influenced by a particular legislator's malice."104 Indeed, the "class
of one" would be satisfied by a showing that a particular homeowner or
group of homeowners has been treated differently, or it might entail an
entire community.105 The doctrine could be applied to protect
communities or groups of property owners historically powerless in
condemnation challenges, who have been "targeted for eminent
domain."106 For example, as David Dana has explained, condemnation
that affects low-income families in middle-class neighborhoods could
107
potentially rise to the level of defining a class by income or race,
particularly "if all homeowners in a group targeted for eminent domain
were black," while other property owners unaffected by eminent domain
were white. 108 This, of course, would entail heightened scrutiny, since
race falls within that purview under the Supreme Court's equal
protection doctrine. However, if the class of one doctrine was applied
based on low-income or poverty-stricken homeowners or property

101 See Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 51-52
(2008); see also Blackman, supra note 14, at 727.
102 See Blackman, supra note 14, at 727.
103 Id.
104

Id.

105 Id.
106

Id. at 730.

107 Dana, supra note 48.
108 See Blackman, supra note 14, at 730.
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owners, then a rational basis standard of review would apply. 109 Indeed,
a class of one doctrine applied to eminent domain challenges does not
ask whether the taking is "necessary to achieve a certain public purpose,
but rather scrutinizes the decision to take the particular plot of
property."nlo
Thus, the coalescence of equal protection's class of one and takings
doctrine does not necessarily seek to ascertain whether a municipality
"needed" a person's home or property for economic development
purposes, or some other justifiable public use, but "[r]ather, the inquiry
would be to question the choice to take" that property instead of other
similarly situated properties.", The blending of equal protection's class
of one and takings doctrine offers a fine example of additional
constraints on economic development takings. Beyond the application
of the blended doctrine in takings, it is also possible, as Justice Kennedy
alluded, that heightened standards of review in condemnation
challenges should apply beyond the broad conceptions espoused by
Berman and Midkiff.112 Indeed, while the Olech decision helps to
mitigate the problems associated with arbitrary zoning legislation, the
decision also offers a cross-pollination of equal protection's class of one
and takings doctrine that may provide greater protections to private
property beyond the traditional public use and just compensation
constraints and, likewise, "diminish the ability of the government to use
eminent domain for private development."113 However, like the
exactions-public use doctrinal tandem in National City Environmental,
class of one equal protection in takings has limited utility across the
states.
Few plaintiffs have "proposed using the Olech rule to challenge an
eminent domain taking for private development."114 In the years since
Olech, there have been some states courts that have reviewed challenges
on the commingled theory that a property owner had "been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
109 Id.
110 Id. at 734 (emphasis added).

111 Id.
112 Id. at 746.
113

Id. at 748.

114

Id. at 700.
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there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.115 In Hargrove
v. New York City School Construction Authority, for example, a
landowner sought review of a state agency's decision to condemn her
property. 116 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second
Department held that the landowner was not denied equal protection
and the state agency's determination was rationally related to a public
purpose. 117 There, the agency sought to condemn property for purposes
of building a public school. 118 The property owner raised the class of one
doctrine, arguing there was evidence to suggest the state agency had
"intentionally treated" the owner differently from other similarly
situated landowners, and the taking had no rational basis.119 The court
declined to accept the class of one doctrine, noting that nothing in the
record suggests that building a public school is not rationally related to a
20
public purpose.1
Another example is Goldstein v. New York State Urban
Development Corp.12, There, the Atlantic Yards economic development
project was challenged by a group of landowners in Brooklyn. The
properties included both homes and businesses slated for condemnation
for purposes of redevelopment. The court was faced with, among other
claims, an allegation that a taking for economic development purposes
where homeowners and businesses were subject to condemnation to
22
advance a redevelopment project, was in violation of equal protection. 1
The basis for the equal protection claim was that the homeowners and
businesses located within the projected redevelopment area had been
intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated.123 The
court made short shrift of the argument, noting that the determination
by the agency to condemn the homeowner's property was for a rational

115

See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 562, 564 (2000).

116 944 N.Y.S.2d 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012).
117

Id. at 316.

118 Id.
119

Id.

Id.
121 879 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009).
120

122

Id.

123

Id.
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basis, conformed with the state constitution's public use clause, and thus
was not constitutionally infirm. 124
Nonetheless, the foregoing is evidence that takings law is flexible
and fluid. These unique doctrinal precedents intermingling with
constitutional standards offer scholars an opportunity to explore similar
combinations of doctrines to impose greater protections for private
property. Because the federal takings doctrine and the text of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause offer limited constraints on the publicuse vein of the Takings Clause, we ought to look to federalist
dimensions in takings jurisprudence125 to fully appreciate both the
usefulness and the limitations of a new cross-pollinated takings doctrine
like the "state constitutional general welfare doctrine." 126
II.

FEDERALISM, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, AND TAKINGS

A.

New Federalismand State Constitutionalism

Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote, "It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."127 Not long after his
plea for states to exercise their independence, federal courts, indeed,
loosened their stranglehold on state autonomy to innovate
doctrinally.128 The prevailing wisdom for a state-law preference to
innovation is based largely on a concern for expansive federal power
over the states, which some argue may inhibit growth and progress. 129
This story is as old as the federal Constitution itself: states are sovereign
entities and thus are independent and autonomous "within their proper
Id.
125 See Stewart E. Sterk, The FederalistDimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,114
YALE L.J. 203, 271 (2004).
126 See infra Part III.
127 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
128 See Scott Dodson, The GravitationalForce of FederalLaw, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 703, 704-05
124

(2016).
129 See, e.g., Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the ConstitutionalPendulum, 77
ALB.L. REv. 1365, 1369-70 (2014).
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sphere of authority."130 Justice William Brennan urged state courts to
play a greater role in protecting constitutional rights by relying on state
constitutions as more effective guarantors of individual rights than the
U.S. Constitution. 131 He called for state supreme courts to interpret their
respective constitutions in ways that did not necessarily conform to, or
perhaps were independent of, the federal document. 132
New Federalism envisions a democracy where state courts play a
greater role in constitutional law doctrine by providing stronger
protections to individual liberties at the state level, beyond what the
federal document provides. 133 This is, in other words, a highly federalist
vision of democracy, with states playing an outsized role.134 Indeed,
135 While
Justice Brennan, likewise, called upon states to experiment.
there are many advocates for New Federalism and robust state
constitutionalism, 136 it was Justice Brennan who saw an opportunity for
state courts to depart explicitly from the federal constitutional
baseline137 and promote an agenda that believed individual liberties
were better protected under state, rather than federal, constitutional
law. 138 In Michigan v. Mosley, for example, Justice Brennan, referring to
the Court's previous Miranda decision, explained in his dissent that the
majority's decision eroded Miranda's standards as a matter of federal
constitutional law, and that "it is appropriate to observe that no State is
precluded by the decision from adhering to higher standards under state
law... than is required by the Federal Constitution."139 Miranda would
not be the last time Justice Brennan expressly advocated for New

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996).
131 Brennan, supra note 18.
130

132

Id.

See Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1191-94
(1977).
134 See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L. REV.
761, 762 (1992).
135 See Brennan, supra note 18, at 490-91.
133

136 See id. at 500.

137 See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 1974).
138 See Brennan, supra note 18, at 502.
139 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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Federalism from the bench.140 His point was that where the Supreme
Court either sets forth new or preserves existing baseline protections of
civil liberties and individual rights, state courts may depart or deviate
from the constitutional bottom, so long as the issue is not field
preempted.
In reality, however, it is arguably the case that Justice Brennan's
New Federalism and Justice Brandeis's laboratories of democracy have
not necessarily come to fruition the way they were envisioned. State
actors are somewhat hesitant to divert from federal constitutional
doctrine and interpretive modes of analysis. State courts often simply
follow federal doctrine, even when they have the luxury of the same, or
substantially the same, constitutional language before them. 141 However,
the post-Kelo divergence from federal takings doctrine is an exception
to the relative dearth of independent state constitutionalism.
B.

State Constitutionalismand Takings
1.

Background State Law

Constitutional protections to property are derived from the
Takings Clause. But, of course, like many areas of constitutional law, the
protections are actually derived from extracanonical sources of state
background property law. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Murr
offered a lesson of how the background of state property law is of
paramount importance to inquiries into property disputes. Specifically,
Chief Justice Roberts's dissent walked through the importance of state
law as a backdrop to understanding private property protections. He
noted, "Our decisions have, time and again, declared that the Takings
Clause protects private property rights as state law creates and defines
them."142 Indeed, "property interests.., are created and their

140 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454-55 & n.4 (1976) (Brennan,
J.,
dissenting); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 338-39 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 715, 735 n.18 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
141 See Dodson, supra note 128, at 703.
142 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."143
It is state legislatures and state common law that dictate and create
property rights, while the Constitution provides the baseline protections
to those property rights. 144 Likewise, state courts have relatively broad
discretion to depart from federal doctrine and room to interpret state
14 5
However, an express
constitutional provisions in divergent ways.
requirement to conform to the Court's takings doctrine is not evident. 146
State actors are also subject to state constitutional restrictions under the
state's takings clause, which raises questions as to whether they ought to
depart from the constitutional bottom of takings doctrine or maintain
looser strictures.147
For many landowners, protections from regulatory takings are
determined by background principles of state legislation and common
law. 148 While Supreme Court doctrine establishes "a floor below which
state courts cannot go to protect individual rights," states have wide
149
latitude to afford greater protections under state constitutions.
Landowners threatened by eminent domain takings also enjoy similar
background state law protections. There is no constitutional constraint
on the government negotiating and purchasing private property from
an owner. The primary constitutional constraints of public use and just
compensation are triggered when the government seeks to seize private
property involuntarily from its owner. Clearly, the government can
compel the conveyance of title. However, to successfully compel, the
government must satisfy the public use and just compensation tests. If
both, or even just one, strand is not satisfied, then the taking is
unconstitutional. That is, the government cannot successfully pay just
compensation at fair market value and take the property for purposes
other than public use, such as for purely private purposes. But this
Id. at 1951 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)).
144 See Sterk, supra note 125, at 272.
143

146

Id.
Id.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

See State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1003 (Wash. 2010).

145
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Article is unconcerned with the just compensation vein, although it
deserves (and has received) quite a bit of scholarly attention. Instead, we
are concerned with the lack of constraints on public use.
When a property owner is compelled to transfer his property to the
government involuntarily, the particular state eminent domain
legislation sets forth the appropriate public uses for a taking. These
public uses are measured against the federal Public Use Clause and the
Supreme Court's doctrine. Indeed, the Takings Clause and the Supreme
Court's public use doctrine protect against changes in states' eminent
domain legislation. State legislation that permits a purely private-toprivate transfer of property would likely be unconstitutional, as the
Takings Clause would constrain such an action by requiring a showing
of some public benefit or public purpose.
Debates over the public use doctrine today revolve around the
narrow or broad conception of what public use means, with the latter
meaning "public interest," "public benefit," or a "public purpose." The
Court's ruling in Berman spurred the broader modern-day takings
conception. Justice Douglas stated that "[s]ubject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."150 There, the
Court held that takings for the underlying purpose of clearing slums and
blighted neighborhoods were valid public uses under the Takings
Clause.
Berman not only opened the door for urban renewal projects to
flourish, but also invited just about any conceivable public use as
justification for condemning private property. The Court's Midkiff
ruling struck down a Hawaii statute that allowed fee title to be taken
from landlords and transferred to tenants in an effort to reduce the
concentration of land ownership. This statute was found as a valid
public use, even though the statute authorized private-to-private
conveyance. l5 1 Then, in the Court's Kelo decision, something strange
happened at the state level that upended decades of state conformity
with public use doctrine. 152 It is this abrupt rupture in federal doctrine at

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
152 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
150
151
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the state level that opens a pathway for rethinking how state courts
should interpret their respective public use texts to imply "general
welfare" principles proposed in Part III of this Article.
2.

Federalism and Public Use Resistance after Kelo

In Kelo, the Court upheld economic development takings as a
justifiable public use. 153 Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice
Stevens stated that a long-standing history of preference for "deference
to legislative judgments in this field" colored the Court's decision to
remain above the fray, and where such condemnation determinations
arise, the Court would defer to the legislature. 154 The majority took the
safe route, noting that the Court should not second-guess local
governments' judgments regarding the efficacy of proposed economic
development plans.155 Justice Stevens noted that the "needs of society
have varied between different parts of the Nation" and that courts
should exercise "great respect" to state legislatures and state courts in
discerning local public needs.156 Nothing about the decision was a
surprise and it was arguably expected that state courts would continue
to gravitate towards federal public use doctrine the same way they had
done for decades prior to Kelo.
That is not what happened. State legislatures resisted, arguing that
157
But Justice
economic development was not a justifiable public use.
Stevens's opinion reminded states that they were not tied to the
decision. He noted that if dissatisfied with the decision, states could
amend their eminent domain laws to offer greater protections. In doing
so, Justice Stevens cited the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock as a prime example of a state court
reading its public use clause narrower than the federal clause to
invalidate economic development takings.158 Justice Stevens explained

153

Id.

154

Id. at 480.

155

Id. at 489.

156

Id. at 482.

157

See Somin, supra note 31, at 37.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 n.22.

158
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restrictions

on

. . .

'public

use'

requirements that that are stricter than the federal baseline" or
establishing new requirements as a "matter of state constitutional
law."159

There is some history of states utilizing their state constitutions as
the first and primary mode of interpretation of the law, as opposed to
first leaning on federal law to drive the analytical process. These states
engage in what we call primacy.160 Oregon, Washington, New Jersey,
and New Hampshire, in particular, are a few states that have followed a
form of state constitutionalism, adopting independent interpretations of
their constitutions, although arguably doing so inconsistently. 161 State
courts in these jurisdictions claim to adhere to a strong sense of state
constitutionalism. 162
Primacy is when a state court addresses a state constitutional issue
before considering any federal constitutional issues if both are raised. 163
As Robert Ellickson noted after the Kelo decision, judicial precedent and
the constitutional and statutory texts "are assumed to be sufficiently
open-textured to permit a judicial interpretation that would give
primacy to the federalist values expressed elsewhere in the federal
constitution. That the Justices who heard Kelo ended up writing four

159 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
160 See Justin Long, IntermittentState Constitutionalism,34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 48 (2006).
161 See State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (N.H. 1983) (establishing the primacy doctrine as New
Hampshire law); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955-56 (N.J. 1982) (following
interstitial/supplemental doctrine to reach a result founded on the state constitution as more
protective than the federal Constitution); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981) (en
banc) (establishing the primacy doctrine as Oregon law); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811
(Wash. 1986) (establishing, in line with the dualism doctrine, "neutral criteria" to guide courts
and litigants in deciding when to construe the state constitution differently from analogous
federal clauses); see also Long, supra note 160, at 51.
162 See sources sited supra note 161; see generally Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and
Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancingthe Relationship Between State and Federal
Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 983-86 (1985) (describing various state courts' approaches to
independent state constitutionalism).
163 John W. Shaw, Principled Interpretationsof State Constitutional Law-Why Don't the
'Primacy' States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. PIr. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1993); see, e.g.,
State v. Randant, 136 P.3d 1113, 1117 (Or. 2006) (following the proper sequence in Oregon,
which is to decide state constitutional questions before reaching federal questions).
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quite different opinions supports the notion that there indeed is room
for varying interpretations."164 Indeed, Ellickson is not alone in his
desire for "state courts, not federal courts" to be responsible for limiting
and constraining public use in the eminent domain analysis.165
Following the Kelo decision, an unprecedented wave of eminent
domain reform swept the nation that either barred or restricted
economic development takings. Forty state legislatures amended their
eminent domain statutes to restrict or bar the exercise of eminent
domain in some capacity.166 "Public use" and "public purpose" was
distinguished from economic development justifications in more than
thirty states. 167 State supreme courts provided greater protections
against takings for private use by narrowing the limits of the state public
use clause.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled to only permit
redevelopment takings if the area has serious blight conditions.168 The
Oklahoma high court interpreted its takings clause to prohibit economic
development takings altogether. 169 The Missouri Supreme Court found
economic development takings impermissible.170 The Ohio Supreme
Court in City of Norwood v. Horney expressly ignored the Kelo decision,
noting it was not "bound to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
determinations of the scope of the Public Use Clause in the federal
Constitution" and interpreted its public use clause as constitutionally
limiting economic development.171 The South Dakota Supreme Court
found "public use" to be narrowed to actual use by the government or

164 Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 751, 762 n.59 (2009).
165

Id.

166 See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After

Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. 82, 84 (2015).

167

Id.

168

See Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 461-62 (N.J.

2007).
See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 650-52 (Okla. 2006).
See State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. 2013).
171 See City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1136 (Ohio 2006).
169
170
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public.172 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to make its
determination based on the federal Public Use Clause. 173
One observation of this backlash is that the post-Kelo state court
rulings may have been a response to subconstitutionalism: the idea that
state constitutions are notorious for failing to constrain state and local
government exercises of police power.
3.

Post-Kelo Constitutional Constraints

As a result of the high level of interchangeable relations between
state constitutions and state governments, some commentators have
dismissed state constitutions as more statutory than constitutional, thus
giving rise to fewer constraints on local and state governments. 174 Eric
Posner and Tom Ginsburg have coined this inferior status of state
canons as "subconstitutionalism."175 They argue that greater
majoritarianism, weaker rights, and constant amendments and revisions
make the state canons less constitutional in nature. 176 The malleability of
the documents, Posner and Ginsburg argue, is evidence that state
constitutions impose fewer constraints on state governments.177 State
constitutions, in other words, operate in a way that focuses on lowerstakes, second-order policy issues within a state rather than focusing on
constraining local and state governments. 178 This is a crucial difference
between a state and the Constitution because, as noted, the federal
document does place constraints on state governments, mainly through
the Supremacy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Since there are
low agency costs as a result of the federal constraints on state
governments, state constitutions relax constraints on both state

172 See Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 2006).

173 See Reading Area Water Auth. v. Schuylkill River Greenway Ass'n, 100 A.3d 572, 582 (Pa.
2014).
174 See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 107-08 (1988);

Gardner, supra note 134, at 819-20.
175 Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism,62 STAN. L. REv. 1583 (2010).
176 Id. at 1584, 1594.
177

Id. at 1593.

178

Id. at 1606-07.
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legislatures and local municipalities.179 As Posner and Ginsburg point
out, however, the disadvantage is that state government is, well, less
constrained.180 Thus, as subnational documents, state constitutions may
not provide the kind of checks on their state governments the way the
federal document does.181
There are plenty of examples where a lack of state constitutional
constraints leads to arguably problematic policy decisions by state
governments. Take public education, for example. It is usually a policy
matter dealt with exclusively by local governments through local
property tax regimes. 182 These regimes play a significant role in funding
and operating public education at the local level. 183 Most states operate a
public school system where local governments are, for the most part,
184 However,
some state
unconstrained by state constitutions.
governments have attempted to impose constraints on this localist rule
when a fundamental right, such as public education, is threatened by
localism.185 In other words, public education has been found by some
state governments to be a "sufficiently important statewide matter to
justify an exception to the normal rules of play" where local
86
municipalities allocate school resources through local taxation.1
Subconstitutionalism may help explain, or perhaps better understand,
the post-Kelo state constitutional amendments to takings clauses and
state court rulings seeking to rein in local governments' takings powers.
For example, eleven states amended their state constitutions to be
more restrictive on municipal takings than the Constitution and the
Supreme Court. 187 In Texas, the state constitution was amended to
preclude takings to transfer "to a private entity for the primary purpose

180

at 1607.
Id. at 1585.

181

Id. at 1596.

182

See David J. Barron, A Localist Critiqueof the New Federalism,51 DUKE L.J. 377, 381-401

179 Id.

(2001).
183

See id. at 394-98.

184

See id. at 390-98.

185

Id. at 395.
Id.

186

187 See Somin, supra note 31, at 39.
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of economic development or enhancement of tax revenue."188 In
Virginia, amendments prohibited takings where the "primary use is for
private gain, private benefit, private enterprise, increasing jobs,
increasing tax revenue, or economic development," which is arguably
more restrictive than in Texas.189 Florida passed a constitutional
amendment with far less teeth than other states, revising the document
to simply state that property taken by eminent domain "may not be
conveyed to a... private entity."190 The Louisiana Constitution was
amended to mandate that condemnation of blighted property be
justified by the fact that blight causes health and safety problems, and is
prohibited for "predominantly" private uses or solely economic
development. 191 Michigan's amended constitution raised the standard of
proof to condemn blighted property to "clear and convincing evidence,"
while also narrowing the definition of blight, and removing economic
development and "tax revenue" enhancing justifications from the
definition of public use. 192 South Carolina revised its document to
require that properties designated as blighted must be a danger to the
public health and safety and added an outright restriction on economic
development takings. 193 In North Dakota, the constitutional
amendments post-Kelo peered directly into the state public use clause,
completely striking economic development from consideration as a
public use. 194
If state legislatures and state populaces were willing to amend state
constitutions to constrain the public use clause in response to rampant
economic development takings by local governments, but statutory
loopholes left the possibility of private enterprise takings intact,195 then
it would seem that other sources of state constitutional law would aptly
provide a conceptual engine to explore new constraints imposed on
municipalities.
As
Posner
and
Ginsburg
suggest,
while
188 TEx. CONST. art I, § 17(b).
189 VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
190 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c).
191 LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 4(B)(1)(a), (B)(2)(c), (B)(3).
192 MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2.
193 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13(B).

194 N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16.
195 See Somin, supra note 31, at 42.
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subconstitutionalism arguably encourages fewer constraints on local
governments,1 96 it may explain why state actors post-Kelo have imposed
greater restrictions on local government eminent domain powers under
the state constitution.
But in imposing those restrictions, state jurists and scholars
neglected another implication of the post-Kelo backlash; that is, state
courts failed to recognize an underlying obligation for local
municipalities to satisfy "general welfare" principles as part of the public
use test when taking private property for economic development
purposes. 197 As Audrey McFarlane has explained, the "exercise of the
police power by local government comes with certain implicit
obligations."198 If the Kelo decision taught us anything, it is that state
courts, as a matter of constitutional law, may fill the gaps or raise the
floor on protections to private property beyond the federal minima. As
Jane Baron explains, "Kelo clearly establishe[d] that, for federal
constitutionalpurposes, 'public use' will be defined in broadly deferential
terms... ."199 But, Kelo also taught us that nothing, in other words,
precludes state courts from "tethering" general welfare principles-just
like courts prior to Lingle tethered due process concepts to takings-to
the text of state public use clauses in an attempt to constrain the rather
broad and inclusive conception of public use set forth by the federal
takings doctrine.
III.

EQUATING PUBLIC USE WITH GENERAL WELFARE PRINCIPLES

The proposition of this Article is that state public use clauses
should, in limited circumstances, be understood to equate with state
general welfare principles as a matter of state constitutional law-what I
196 See generally Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 175.
197 Only two scholars, to the best of my knowledge, have raised the potential for direct
constitutional constraints on eminent domain. See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 42-60 (arguing
that general welfare should be a consideration in urban redevelopment projects likened to those
in Berman v. Parker); Dana, supra note 48, at 8 (proposing an "exclusionary eminent domain
doctrine" that would not absolutely bar economic development takings or condemnation of
.
low-income housing but "would result in the application of heightened review.
198 McFarlane, supra note 33, at 50.
199

Baron, supra note 50, at 652 (emphasis added).
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call "state constitutional general welfare doctrine." Like the unique mix
of class of one equal protection and takings doctrine or the tethering of
substantially advances tests and takings, state general welfare principles
under state constitutions could arguably be commingled with, if not
bound to, state public use clauses, as an additional "source of
constitutional meaning."200 To understand this doctrinal proposal postKelo, we need to untangle the ubiquitous and arguably ambiguous
meanings of "public use" and "police power."
A.

The Police Power and Public Use

As Thomas Cooley has noted, the police power is "to preserve the
public order and to prevent offenses against the State, but also to
establish for the intercourse of citizen with those rules of good manners
and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of
rights. ... "201 That states have a general "police power" to protect
health, safety and "general welfare" of the state's citizens is the essence
of the federalist regime.202 Indeed, the Framers wanted the states to

maintain "residual sovereignty" regarding state and local matters. 203 But,
while the police power is well-known, its application and definition is
"uninstructive."204 It is arguably one of the "most
misunderstood ideas

in constitutional law" because the "meaning and implications of the
term are far from clear."205 As Stephen Miller notes, "There is arguably
no other aspect of law so ubiquitous and so incapable of definition;
moreover, there may be no other area of law where courts and
commentators have come to consider this as an acceptable status

200 See Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization,128 YALE
L.J. 954, 990 (2019).
201 THOMAS M.

COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST

UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 671 (Little, Brown,

and Co. 3d ed. 1874).
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 139 (8th ed. 2010).
Hon. Randy J. Holland, State Jury Trials and Federalism: Constitutionalizing Common
Law Concepts, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 373, 389 (2004).
204 Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
202 JOHN E. NOWAK
203

745, 747 (2007).
205 Id.
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The concept's relationship to the public use doctrine is
equivocal, but little has been written on the exercise of eminent domain
207
and the police power.
The Supreme Court's rhetoric in its three most important public
use cases is instructive on the relationship between "public use" and
"police power." In Berman, the Court, reviewing whether an urban
renewal project to clear urban slums in the District of Columbia
satisfied a public use, stated "[w]e deal, in other words, with what
traditionally has been known as the police power. An attempt to define
its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on
its own facts."208 Justice Douglas equated the public use test with the
broad police powers of the state, conflating substandard housing and
blighted areas as "injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare," with the government action of taking private property in slum
areas as a necessary "public use."209 The Court, seemingly
acknowledging and accepting the vastness of the term, pivoted to the
legislature as the final determinative institution, noting that "[s]ubject to
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs to be served by social legislation ....."210 Then, the Court seemed
to mix the police power with the public use test, noting that the
"[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order ...are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
application of the police power to municipal affairs [and] illustrate the
scope of the power and do not delimit it.... The concept of the public
welfare is broad and inclusive."211
Then, in Midkiff, Justice O'Connor proclaimed that, "[t]he 'public
use' requirement is... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
quo."206

206 Stephen R. Miller, Community Rights and the Municipal Police Power, 55 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 675, 680 (2015).

207 D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471
(2004).
208 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
209 Id. at 31.
210 Id. at 32.
211 Id. at 32-33.
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police powers."212 Justice O'Connor went on to state that there is "a role
for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what
constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is
equated with the police power."213 Both passages from O'Connor and
Douglas were odd and confusing commingling of public use and the
police power, essentially broadening the scope of public use by
acknowledging that, like the police power, it is expansive and mostly a
legislative determination. As Bradley Karkkainen explains, the New
Deal-era Court completely muddied the term "general welfare" as a
result of the Court's insistence on deference to legislative
determinations.214 The term "swelled" to include a broad range of
legislative "public interests" regardless of whether the public benefit or
public use was reserved for a particular class.215 Finally, in Kelo, Justice
Stevens channeled Justice O'Connor's sentiments on the role of courts
in takings review, stating that "nothing" in the opinion "precludes [state
courts and state legislatures] from placing" stronger restrictions on
"public use" than the federal minima as a "matter of state
constitutional
law."216

Some scholars argue that "in the Court's eyes, the problematic
exercise of governmental power being challenged by the property owner
was the scope and purpose of the redevelopment plan, not the exercise
of the eminent domain power... ." and that the case is better
understood as a ruling on the scope of the state and local government's
exercise of the police power.217 Others have argued that the Court's
Berman decision gave rise to a "de facto" authority to justify local
government exercises of the police power. 218 But the extent and
operational basis of the police power was still not really made clear by
the Supreme Court, and it seems that where private property rights are
at issue, the Court is reluctant to make a conclusive determination of

212
213
214

Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
Id.
See Karkkainen, supra note 40, at 899.

Id.
216 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
217 McFarlane, supra note 33, at 46.
218 See Miller, supra note 206, at 696.
215
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219
what is public use and what are the limitations on police power.
Instead, the Supreme Court has preferred to defer to legislative
determinations as its fallback.
As some commentators have argued, Berman was not a case about
the police power, nor should it have been.220 Indeed, the question was
whether a federal urban renewal program that would clear slums in the
District of Columbia was a justifiable "public use" under the Takings
Clause. But Justices Douglas and Justice O'Connor in Midkiff instead
equated the public use test with the broad police powers of the state.
This was a departure from the separate and distinct modes of analysis
between the police power and eminent domain; that is, the traditional
notion that the police power regulation was noncompensable, while the
exercise of eminent domain did not require a police power justification,
2
only that the taking be for the public use upon just compensation. 21 As
Thomas Merrill explains, "if public use is truly coterminous with the
police power, a state could freely choose between compensation and
noncompensation any time its actions served a 'public use."'222 But, as
James Krier and Christopher Serkin argue, if public use was truly
coterminous with the police power, then the Takings Clause would be
interpreted to mean "nor shall private property be taken pursuant to the
police power, without just compensation."223 Instead, they argue,
equating police power with public use "seems to have done away with
serious judicial scrutiny of the public-use question.224
Part of the problem was created by Congress justifying the urban
renewal project on the basis of its police power because the project
would remove substandard housing and blighted areas that were,
according to Congress, "injurious to the public health, safety, morals,
and welfare," thus making the taking of the property in those areas
necessary as a "public use."225 If the police power is whatever the

219

Id.

220

See Karkkainen, supra note 40, at 899.
Id.

221

Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 70 (1986).
James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 862-63;
JESSE DUKEMTNIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1010, 1014 (9th ed. 2017).
also
see
224 Krier & Serkin, supra note 223, at 862-63.
222
223

225 See Karkkainen, supra note 40, at 900.
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legislature deems it to be, then "general welfare" has no "judicially
apparent enforceable limit[s]."226 Indeed, it is arguably the case that the
Court's Berman decision, conflating "public use" and "police power,"
unraveled the "project of judicial policing of the bounds of the police
power" that long served the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence.227 One might ask, is it really the case that the Court
meant to broaden the police power and general welfare to operate
"without meaningful limits"?228 The problem seems to be
that "a catchall category of 'general welfare' was added to 'public health, safety, and
morals' in the standard list of legitimate police power purposes, and
courts and commentators came to regard the police power as exceeding
the narrow bounds of nuisance prevention."229 The expansion of general
welfare into the police power constraints was not always so broad
though. General welfare was both narrowly construed and defined to
mean "for the mutual benefit of property owners generally" or "for the
benefit of the entire public."230
The term "general welfare" is oft-repeated by state courts in local
disputes. It is an accepted truism at the state level that the police power
is constrained by principles of "health, safety and general welfare." But
the term is still ill-defined. As McFarland notes, in light of Berman,
"what is the general welfare? This is an important question without
an
immediately self-evident answer because of the context of social
relations within which the police power is exercised."231 General welfare
is universally understood to place a limit on police power actions, such
as the enactment of zoning and land use ordinances to ensure such
actions promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
community.32 As most state courts in New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania hold, "the general welfare is not fostered or promoted by a

226

Id.

227

Id.

228

Id.

229

Id. at 896.

230

231

Id. at 896-97.
See McFarlane, supra note 33, at 52.

232

See Cleaver v. Bd. of Adjustment, 200 A.2d 408,412 (Pa. 1964).
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zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and exclusionary."233 And in
these jurisdictions, the police power is constitutionally constrained by
general welfare principles in the zoning context.
But read in the context of federalism concerns in takings, the
Court's high-profile eminent domain opinions in Berman, Midkiff, and
Kelo offer state courts an opportunity to explore state constitutional
provisions to find constraints on public use that may serve as a source of
additional protections to private property beyond the post-Kelo
legislation. There is a place for state courts to constrain exercises of
police power, including eminent domain takings, and Justice Stevens's
invocation of state constitutional law as a vehicle for "placing stronger
restrictions"234 on public use is where this Article sets out to propose a
state constitutional general welfare doctrine. The question is what is the
precise course of additional constraints. The answer lies in the inherent
powers delegated to local governments by state legislatures. It is that
inherent power, derived from state authority, that implicitly constrains
local governments from exercising police powers, even if in the name of
parochial localism, that disadvantages certain populations or has an
impact on the broader region or state beyond the lines of the locality.
If "public use" and the "police power," taken together, mean that
private property may be taken so long as it is exercised to accomplish
the protection of the health, safety, and morals of the community, then
nothing precludes state courts from interpreting state public use clauses
to provide additional (if not alternative) protections to private property
than the federal baseline as a "matter of state constitutional law" by
tethering general welfare to public use. State courts normatively should
consider the implicit obligation of local governments to exercise their
takings power to satisfy general welfare principles within or as part of
the "public use" inquiry. The Mount Laurel saga in New Jersey provides
an apt example of how general welfare principles, as a matter of state
constitutional law, have been imposed to constrain local government
exercises of its police power.

233 Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (Pa. 1965); see also S.Burlington Cty.
NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 448 (N.J. 1983).
234 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
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General Welfare Constraintson Police Power

There are examples where state courts, as a result of state
constitutional law, have imposed constraints on police power actions
based precisely on a narrowed approach to what state actions or
regulations satisfy "general welfare." A Michigan appellate court noted
that the "term 'general welfare' ... is not a mere catchword to permit the
translation of narrow desired into ordinances which discriminate
against or operate to exclude certain residential uses deemed
beneficial."35 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, likewise, has noted that
the "general welfare is not fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance
designed to be exclusive and exclusionary."236 The Court went further,
noting that "of course, minimum lot areas may not be ordained so large
as to be exclusionary in effect and, thereby, serve a private rather than
the public interest."237 A minority of state courts in California and New
York have been explicit in their attempt to carve out a doctrine that
imposes a constitutional requirement that local municipalities further
the general welfare.238 Indeed, these doctrines imposing state
constitutional requirements on municipalities to further the general
welfare derive from several discrete areas of the law.
First, state constitutions may include an existing clause that
explicitly sets forth the constitutional requirement.239 Second, state
courts may implicitly read the requirement as part of the police power,
and find that such power can only be exercised to further the general
welfare.240 Third, the general welfare requirement on municipalities is
frequently imposed by statute, such as standard zoning enabling laws.

Green v. Lima Twp., 199 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
Kohn, 215 A.2d at 612.
237 Id. at 612 n.30 (quoting Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Easttown Twp., 141
A.2d 851, 858 (Pa. 1958)).
238 Henry A. Span, How the Court Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV.
1(2001).
239 S. Burlington Cry. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (N.J. 1983) ("The
constitutional basis for the Mount Laurel doctrine remains the same. The constitutional power
to zone ... is but one portion of the police power and, as such, must be exercised for the
general welfare.").
240 Id.
235
236
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As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in Mount Laurel, "the
constitutional basis ...remains the same.., the constitutional power to
zone, delegated to the municipalities subject to legislation, is but one
portion of the police power and, as such, must be exercised for the
general welfare."241 The court went further, explaining that "any police
power enactment. . . must promote public health, safety, morals or the
general welfare" and that "general welfare" is indeed broad in such a
manner to encompass health, safety, and morals.242
Under the New Jersey Constitution's general welfare clause, for
example, local governments are required to act in a manner that
advances the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of residents by
mandating that developing municipalities zone to make reasonable
availability and opportunity for low-income housing developers to build
affordable housing.243 This affirmative duty imposes an additional
constraint on state police power. 244 The state supreme court, thus, stated
that "a zoning regulation, like any police power enactment, must
promote public health, safety, morals or the general welfare."245 The
Mount Laurel ruling established that governments have an obligation,
under their police power, to make affordable housing available and
integrate communities.246 As the infamous Mount Laurel saga in New
Jersey determined, "[i]t is required that, affirmatively, a zoning
regulation, like any police power enactment, must promote ... the
general welfare... [and] a zoning enactment which is contrary to the
general welfare is invalid."247
Indeed, in New Jersey, "police power enactments" must conform to
"basic constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection [and] which may be more demanding than those of the
federal constitution."248 There, "general welfare" principles must be
followed under the state constitution, and if they were not, then zoning

241

Id.

242 S.Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J. 1975).
243 Id. at 717, 723-24.
244 Id. at 724-25.
245

Id.
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Id.
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laws are "theoretically" invalid as a matter of state constitutional law.249

Of course, part of the general welfare inquiry, at least in the zoning
context, is whose "general welfare must be served."250 For example,
"when regulation does have a substantial external [statewide]
impact,
the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the border of the particular
municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and
served."21 As Nestor Davidson explains, "The court thus brought to the
surface both the regional (spatial) and normative dimensions of Mount
Laurel's exclusion, and Mount Laurel's constitutional theory relied on
the intersection of those considerations."252
It is important to note that New Jersey is an outlier state where
state courts imply constitutional constraints on local police powers
through general welfare principles. Further, another obstacle worth
mentioning is that "general welfare" is vague and traditionally
inherently a creature of political institutions.253 Like state courts in New
Jersey imposing a general welfare requirement, if state courts were to
evaluate eminent domain based on whether it meets general welfare
requirements, instead of simply determining if it accrues a public
benefit or has a public purpose, then the courts will have "only the vague
notion of the 'general welfare' to guide" them, which makes such
determinations potentially "standardless."24 Nonetheless, such an
outlier still provides a thoughtful foundation for thinking of ways for
which state public use clauses should be tethered to general welfare
principles.
C.

EquatingPublic Use with General Welfare

As the Tennessee Supreme Court has noted, "state governments
may enact any laws reasonably related to the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of the people, subject only to the constraints imposed by... state
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250 Id. at 725-26.
251
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252 See Davidson, supra note 200, at 995.
253 See Span, supra note 238, at 3.
254 Id.

2986

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2943

constitutions."25 Our traditional notion of public use and the police
power is that any legislative act which purports to facilitate
governmental efforts to reduce a hazard to public health, safety, morals,
26
or general welfare is exempt from state constitutional constraints. But
that notion, if not assumption, should be challenged. Once the state
legislature has delegated the power of eminent domain to local
municipalities (which it does), exercises of eminent domain become
constitutional in nature and therefore could be subject to implied
general welfare constraints under or within the public use clause of state
constitutions. Even if local and state legislation is given a presumption
of constitutionality, "a[n] [eminent domain] statute premised upon the
police power" should be subject to constitutional protections under the
Takings Clause and the broader principles of general welfare.257
The traditional approach to constraining "public use" was for state
courts to "build on state public use precedents that have read 'public
use' in state constitutional public use clauses as something narrower or
more constrained than anything that might be classified as beneficial to
the public or pertaining to a matter of a legitimate government
concern."258 While some state courts have done this post-Kelo, none, to
the best of my knowledge, have made the doctrinal move to equate
public use with general welfare principles. Some states, like Washington,
offer some guidance, if not, a roadmap.
The Washington Supreme Court views the "police power" and the
power of eminent domain as distinct, noting that the terms have been
used "elastically and imprecisely."259 That Court has interpreted its
public use clause to require takings that promote "the general
welfare."260 As a result, one might argue that the Washington State
takings clause implicitly equates public use with general welfare

255 SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, 363 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tenn. 2012); see also Motlow
v. State, 145 S.W. 177, 188-89 (Tenn. 1912).
256 Bd. of Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (Va. 1959).
257 School Bd. of City of Norfolk v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 329 (Va. 1987); see also

Carper, 107 S.E.2d at 395.
258 Dana, supra note 48, at 60.
259
260

Eggleston v. Pierce Cty., 64 P.3d 618, 623 n.6 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
Id. at 622.
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principles.261 The Connecticut Supreme Court has noted that "the
promotion of the general welfare is made the foundation principle of
eminent domain."262 In City of Utica v. Damiano, the court conflated
eminent domain with general welfare, questioning whether there was
"any reason to suppose that the power of eminent domain
may not be
extended under the general welfare power to encourage the
development of private property to meet a compelling community
economic need."263 New York state appellate courts have consistently
noted that their constitution's "public use" definition is "broadly defined
to encompass any use which contributes to the health, safety, general
welfare, convenience or prosperity of the community.264
A California appellate court seemed to suggest that under its state
constitution, takings for purposes of public health, safety, or morals that
are not "essential to the general welfare" may not meet the public use
test.265 These examples, however useful, can cut both ways in the takings
context. On the one hand, economic development takings are arguably
exercised for the very purpose of enhancing the general welfare by
revitalizing blighted city neighborhoods. On the other hand, urban
renewal takings arguably run afoul of general welfare principles by
targeting minority neighborhoods and displacing poor residents from
city neighborhoods. But the point here is that state courts, which enjoy
wide-ranging latitude to offer additional (usually greater) protections
beyond the constitutional baseline set by the Supreme Court, are not
restricted from venturing outside the scope of the state takings clause to
tether and impose a general welfare requirement in its public use test
that would scrutinize local government exercises of eminent domain
that run afoul of equity and inclusion.
Take, for example, Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay,
Inc. v. City of Livermore, where the court explained that when "we

261Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 212 (Wash. 2000).
262 Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert, 88 A.633, 646-47 (Conn. 1913).
263 See, e.g., City of Utica v. Damiano, 193 N.Y.S.2d 295, 300 (County Ct., Oneida Cty. 1959).
264 Byrne v. N.Y. State Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Pres., 476 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y.
App. Div. 4th Dep't 1984); see also 225 Front St., Ltd. v. City of Binghamton, 877 N.Y.S.2d 486,
488 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dep't 2009); Aspen Creek Estates, Ltd. v. Town of Brookhaven, 848
N.Y.S.2d 214, 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007).
265 Hunter v. Adams, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (Cal. Dist. Ct App. 1960).

2988

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2943

inquire whether an ordinance reasonably relates to the public welfare
[such] inquiry should begin by asking whose welfare must the ordinance
serve... [b]ut ... an ordinance ... may be disclosed as unreasonable
when viewed from a larger perspective."266 Indeed, it is not the result on
residents in a particular locality, but instead the entire region or state
that should be considered under state constitutional general welfare
doctrine. Or, as some scholars argue, general welfare principles provides
"values such as equity and inclusion to bear in the doctrine."267 Indeed,
in theory state constitutional general welfare doctrine would "advance
the actual, general welfare of the people of the state" as a result of the
plenary power that the state wields over state and local matters,
especially when state legislatures delegate the eminent domain power to
local governments through its eminent domain codes.
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
As discussed in Part I, a variety of examples exist that show how
constitutional doctrines can mix to provide greater protections to
private property. Olech's class of one equal protection doctrine has been
cross-pollinated with takings at the state level in an attempt to protect
homeowners and other private property interests. Likewise, the
substantially advances tests have been tethered to takings doctrine, while
the Court's exactions doctrine has been tested in eminent domain
challenges to restrict local government economic development takings.
And, finally, the Court's exactions heightened standard of review has
been tethered to public use inquiries. The addition of state
constitutional general welfare doctrine to the mix raises questions of
how the connection between general welfare and public use plays out
doctrinally. Part IV provides some insight into how state courts would
apply general welfare principles to the public use test in a variety of
taking contexts. As explained, the source of "state constitutional general
welfare doctrine" is an expansive view of local governments obligations
to residents within and outside a particular locality, giving consideration
to the inherent delegation of state police powers, such as exercises of
266 557 P. 2d 473, 485-89 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).

267 See Davidson, supra note 200, at 987.
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eminent domain, to local governments, and that such "a structural
principle" should be understood to "bring values such as equity and
inclusion to bear in the doctrine."268
A.

Urban Redevelopment Takings

Urban renewal is a longstanding traditional use that satisfies the
public use requirement. As noted earlier, in Berman, a redevelopment
agency sought to condemn an area of the District of Columbia to
prevent, reduce, or eliminate slums. The area was decaying and blighted.
But the community was not factored into the equation for
redevelopment.269 The Court in Berman made no mention of "general
welfare" principles as controlling its decision, and merely reiterated the
concept of the police power as broad and inclusive, and that, likewise,
the public use requirement was equal, if not broader, than the police
power.2 70 The ruling, of course, took judicial review out of the public use
equation. Yet, an implied "general welfare" inquiry within public use
may narrow the public use test to restrict takings if applied in a manner
similar to the Mount Laurel doctrine.
As McFarlane argues, the state police power should be interpreted
"when the government exercises the power of eminent domain and also
for proper exercises of the police power in connection with
redevelopment, in general."271 In other words, McFarlane raises the
prospect that the definition of public use should derive under a state's
police power. 272 She also notes that "public purpose relates to the scope
of police power and the way in which local governments should exercise
their power over development" as a result of Mount Laurel.273 She draws
a link to the Berman decision, where the focus of the legal questions was
on whether the plaintiffs business was properly characterized as

268
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269 Keasha Broussard, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain: Urban Revitalization Against

the Backdrop of the Takings Clause, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 99, 105 (2000).
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blighted, arguing that "there are limits, by virtue of constitutional
obligations of police power" of local municipalities' exercise of urban
redevelopment projects that have the effect of gentrifying or
"exclusively" reconfiguring a city for the affluent.274
Under McFarlane's approach, exercises of the police power,
including eminent domain, for purposes of redevelopment that give
preference to the "wealthy" over the poor and minorities would be
"improper."275 Indeed, major urban redevelopment projects, like the one
justified in Berman, offer an additional source of scrutiny if general
welfare principles raised in cases such as Mount Laurel were part of the
public use inquiry under state constitutional law. In other words, a
taking for the purpose of urban redevelopment that had the effect of
facilitating high-end commercial and residential development would
not pass muster under a state constitutional general welfare doctrine.
Indeed, the question arises, "whose general welfare is served" and policy
choices that ignore the needs of a diverse range of the local, regional,
and state populace would be subject to further scrutiny. State
constitutional general welfare doctrinal would require a municipality to
show some evidence of integration and equity in an effort to avoid the
displacement effects of new urban redevelopment projects. Where the
government failed to show such efforts, the taking may be in violation of
a state public use clause primarily because it runs afoul of general
welfare principles.
B.

Prohibitionon Economic Development Takings

A similar concern regarding displacement is raised not only in
urban redevelopment projects where federal monies help subsidize the
costs of development, but also in economic development projects
strictly driven by private investment. A general welfare inquiry as part of
the public use test may offer an additional structural constraint on
economic development takings that result in displacement or exclusion.
For example, "exclusionary eminent domain doctrine" is a narrow
doctrinal test that specifically focuses on low-cost housing and
274
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displacement from middle-class neighborhoods in urban areas. The
doctrine attacks "exclusionary eminent domain," the phenomenon after
economic development takings that leads to the loss of affordable
housing and the displacement of residents from one neighborhood to
another.276 In other words, "the displaced residents are unable to afford
new housing in the same neighborhood or locality as their nowcondemned, former homes... [and] are excluded not only from their
homes but also from their home neighborhood or locality."277 Even
though exclusionary eminent domain doctrine does not expressly
identify "general welfare" principles as the main source of the inquiry
under public use, such a doctrine would likely fall comfortably under a
general welfare inquiry in public use as part of state constitutional
general welfare doctrine.
Exclusionary eminent domain doctrine's judicial remedy requires a
judge-made evaluation of a municipality's condemnation efforts in light
of the regional need for low-income housing, which is directly tied to
the Mount Laurel doctrine in the zoning context. 278 The proposal then
requires judges to evaluate the impact of the condemnation on a fair
share obligation of affordable housing with respect to those needs.279
This doctrine also employs a rebuttable presumption. If a local
government exercises eminent domain in an urban area that results in a
decrease of affordable housing below or further below its fair share
obligation, then a state court may invalidate the taking.280 This requires
the application of heightened review similar to the Court's exactions test
rather than a rational basis standard. The presumption, in other words,
is that exclusionary condemnations are invalid.281 A local government
could overcome the presumption by showing a need for the economic
redevelopment project.282 The doctrine, thus, shifts the burden to the
municipality to show a compelling justification for the condemnation.283
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The distinction with this Article's state constitutional general
welfare doctrine is that exclusionary eminent domain doctrine fails to
constrain the type of condemnations at issue in Kelo where economic
development was the key driver of the taking in a middle-class
neighborhood affecting middle-class homes.284 So, while Dana's
doctrine is useful to a degree, it mostly "enable[s] state courts to
constrain the use of eminent domain to exclude the poor [by focusing
its inquiry on the loss of affordable housing] without undermining the
use of condemnation for economic development purposes more
generally."285 While the Mount Laurel doctrine is not an explicit
recognition of social costs, it does include the amelioration of
286
Mitigating poverty should be a goal in the
concentrated poverty.
general welfare principles set forth under state constitutional law.287 In

other words, state constitutional general welfare doctrine would
implicate exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, but provide a greater
restraint on the economic development takings.
An egalitarian doctrinal vision of state constitutional general
welfare doctrine imposes the principles of general welfare on any
condemnation that incurs a private benefit through economic
development. Many local governments use tax revenue generation as a
primary reason for condemning land, even if the condemnation
displaces poor or middle-class residents. The City of New London's
purpose for the taking in Kelo was to create jobs and increase tax
revenue. 288 A general welfare constraint on the public use analysis
generally would yield results that limit or completely bar economic
development takings, which is a normative departure from the popular
state legislative reform initiated post-Kelo. Where there is evidence of a
detrimental impact on affordable housing or poor residents as a matter
of general welfare under state constitutional law, the taking would be
barred completely. The general welfare inquiry would also ascertain the

284
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extent to which a private benefit is incurred by the developer under an
economic development taking.
C.

ConstrainingBlight Condemnations

Blight removal is yet another purpose behind many municipalities'
pursuit of taking private property. It is also used as an underlying
motive or pretext for the primary reason for the taking; to achieve
economic development. After Kelo, blight removal provisions under
state eminent domain codes remained untouched by state legislatures,
which gave rise to abuse of blight removal exemptions to achieve the
broader goal of economic development.289 At the same time, some
commentators have conceded that "judicial willingness" to rubberstamp any determination of blight by local lawmakers" makes it all the
more important for state legislatures to "tighten" the criteria for
blight.290 The concern, of course, is that it will be used to "circumvent"
restrictions on economic development takings.291 But a state-level
doctrine that equates general welfare with public use would temper
concerns of municipalities circumventing the loose blight definitions
under state eminent domain codes.
For example, James Ely, Jr. argues that legislatures should define
blight to include property that threatens "health and safety" instead of
defining blight on a neighborhood basis.292 While legislatures could
amend provisions to incorporate Ely's suggestion, it requires political
will to do so. And given state legislatures' reluctance to unequivocally
bar economic development takings, the loose and liberal definitions of
blight will likely continue. Thus, it seems that the "health and safety"
inquiry that Ely suggests under legislative definitions may be better
served as part of the judicial inquiry under state constitutional general
welfare doctrine. In other words, interpreting blight to threaten "health
and safety" as part of a general welfare inquiry of public use clause may
yield a constraint on takings for blight removal under state
289 Somin, supra note 31, at 13.
290 See Ely, supra note 48, at 136.
291
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292
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constitutional law, even in the absence of express statutory or
constitutional language of "general welfare."
Like Mount Laurel, the general welfare concerns derived from state
exercises of zoning. Legislative action that invoked zoning laws was
subject to constitutional scrutiny, even though statutes made no
mention of general welfare. Likewise, most eminent domain codes do
not utilize general welfare language; however, because state legislation
authorizing eminent domain, like zoning, delegates the power to local
municipalities, any exercise of that power at the local level subjects
condemnation to constitutional scrutiny as a matter of general welfare.
As Robert Bird has suggested, "[plolitically vulnerable landowners
might benefit from a closer judicial review given that imbalance of
power between them and the government."293 He argues that imposing a
"modest" judicial check on blight by way of heightened scrutiny would
better serve vulnerable property owners from abusive exercises of
294
eminent domain by local governments.
Perhaps state constitutional general welfare doctrine would require
courts to peer into the underlying motive of a taking justified by blight
removal by weighing the true intent of the taking and whether the
condemnation truly sought to remove blighted, dilapidated, taxdelinquent property from a locality to preserve the integrity of a
neighborhood, or to instead pursue private development and tax
revenue generating goals. Any evidence of an underlying motive that
runs afoul of taking private property to remove blight would be found
violative of general welfare. This constraint on blight removal takings
would not invoke strict scrutiny as a guiding test under general welfare,
largely because such a doctrinal test would cause state courts to
"determine whether or not the landowner is deserving of heightened
protection."295 At its most extreme, equating public use with general
welfare principles may have the effect of forbidding blight removal
takings altogether, "unless 'blight' is defined narrowly to include
neighborhoods that impose extraordinary external costs on

293 Bird, supra note 47, at 266 (proposing heightened standard of review as part of blight
removal justifications).
294
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outsiders."296 This would, as Michael Heller and Rick Hills suggest, leave
exercises of eminent domain for traditional purposes to fall comfortably
within the public use justifications envisioned,297 but demand more
from the government when it seeks blight removal condemnations with
the underlying motive of economic development. Such motive may be
detrimental to the health and safety of low-income residents because the
condemnations result in displacement and exclusion, thus running afoul
of general welfare principles implied in state public use clauses. This
approach to state constitutional general welfare doctrine fits neatly with
the Mount Laurel approach to zoning. Much of the concern of
exclusionary zoning by municipalities is that the exclusion results in
shifting the poor to other municipalities, and that such a result is
violative of general welfare principles, since municipalities must exercise
zoning powers with all state residents, not just local residents, in mind.
As Heller and Hills explain, blighted areas or properties that impose
"extraordinary external costs on outsiders" means that
only takings
targeting extreme slum-like conditions that pose a threat to those living
in a particular vicinity would satisfy general welfare.298
D.

RestrictingEconomic DiscriminationTakings

Finally, there is a legitimate concern that economic development
takings have the effect of economic discrimination.299 As Ronald Chen
explains, reading the concept of blight "together with appropriate
general principles limiting the arbitrary use of police in a way that
disproportionately affects low incomes communities" makes it
acceptable.300 He draws a parallel to the Mount Laurel saga in New
Jersey, noting that the application of equal protection used in zoning
cases is applicable in the eminent domain context where "the powers of
296
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redevelopment, and the power of eminent domain in particular, are
clearly among the police powers of the state" to exercise takings fairly as
an obligation to the poor. 301 In other words, exclusionary exercises of
police power.
Michele Alexandre, likewise, defines "public purpose" in urban
renewal projects as dealing primarily with nondisplacement of poor
residents.302 In other words, Alexandre proposes a redefinition of public
purpose to include "a protection against displacement of economically
marginalized individuals."303 Two of Alexandre's redefined inquiries
under public purpose are familiar to this Article's proposal. Specifically,
Alexandre proposes that courts should consider whether a community
had input in the planning process for urban renewal in a
neighborhood.304 Further, she notes that courts should be weighing
whether local governments and developers considered the effects of and
305 Indeed, by
worked towards preventing displacement of the poor.
virtue of the fact that general welfare principles embedded in state
constitutional law include considerations of "health and safety" along
with "general welfare," state constitutional general welfare doctrine
would likely capture Alexandre's concerns within a public use inquiry.
In other words, community voice and city prevention of displacement
are not concerns rendered strictly to a public use test, but are inherently
considerations pursuant to general welfare principles as a matter of state
constitutional law. Tethering general welfare to public use may provide
state courts reviewing takings with the tools to inquire into
governmental efforts to engage the community in the planning process
or efforts to study, anticipate, prevent, and remedy the impact of
displacement as a matter of state constitutional law.
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CONCLUSION

In a post-Kelo era, scholars neglected a lacuna left after the
nationwide backlash: State courts' failure to recognize an implicit
obligation of local municipalities to satisfy "general welfare" principles
when taking private property for economic development purposes as a
matter of state constitutional law. This Article showed that this gap can
be filled by arguing that state public use clauses should be understood to
equate with state police power general welfare principles-state
constitutional general welfare doctrine. The doctrine offers similar
protections to vulnerable property owners by requiring that exercises of
eminent domain satisfy constitutional duties to take private property for
the public use by relying upon general welfare principles. State
constitutional general welfare doctrine would share a unique place
among other examples of cross-pollination in takings jurisprudence,
including the substantially advances tests, class of one equal protection
doctrine, and exactions doctrine. This Article's proposal is yet another
example of the fluidity and malleability of takings doctrine in providing
greater protections to property owners beyond the traditional public use
and just compensation dichotomy.
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